1	Rebuilding Communities Following Disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles Presenting Author: Laurie Johnson Additional Co-Authors: Ikuo Kobayashi, Hisako Koura, Kazuyoshi Ohnishi, Yoshiteru Murosaki, Robert Olshansky, and Kenneth Topping 7^th US/Japan Workshop on Urban Earthquake Hazard Reduction March 2003
2	Presentation Outline Research Project Overview LA and Kobe Damage and Recovery Study area descriptions Major economic and recovery issues Key Findings, Observations and Conclusions
3	NSF Study on Post-Disaster Redevelopment - Lessons from Kobe and Northridge Multi-year project to study factors facilitating or impeding post-earthquake redevelopment Studied 7 severely-damaged urban districts in these two industrialized regions US/Japan team: Robert Olshansky, Ph.D., AICP (Univ. of Illinois-UC) Laurie Johnson, AICP (RMS) Ken Topping, FAICP (Kobe Univ.) Yoshiteru Murosaki, Ph.D., (Kobe Univ) Kazuyoshi Ohnishi, Ph.D., (Kobe Univ) Hisako Koura, Ph.D., (Osaka Univ) Ikuo Kobayashi, (CoPlan)
4	Research Significance Lessons for future catastrophic earthquakes from the two largest earthquakes to strike modern, industrialized cities Focus on post-disaster redevelopment, meaning reconstruction that adds value Examine a fine-scale of decision-making and physical change in selected districts
5	Mw6.7 Northridge Earthquake: January 17, 1994 57 deaths 20,000 homeless 330,000 damaged housing units ~$42 billion total losses $21 billion residential $15 billion comm/ind $6 billion public infrastructure ~$14 billion insured losses (>65% to residential structures)
6	Los Angeles Earthquake Damage Conditions Pockets of severe damage Moderate damage was widespread
7	Mw6.9 Kobe Earthquake: January 17, 1995 6,400 deaths; >15,000 injuries 400,000 homeless; >240,000 in public shelters >200,000 damaged buildings ~US$150 billion total losses >US$100 bil property damage <$10 bil insured losses (majority to commercial uses)
8	Kobe Earthquake Damage Conditions Widespread severe damage, including road, water, gas, and sewer system damage Many areas of complete destruction Fires consumed 82 hectares of urban land
9	Earthquake Damage in Kobe
10	LA Study Districts
11	Sherman Oaks Study District Highest concentration of damages Relatively high-income area Relied heavily on private resources
12	Hollywood Study District Heavy damage Low-income, large immigrant population Significant government intervention in recovery
13	Canoga Park Study District Area of moderate damage and moderate incomes Before earthquake, commercial district was changing with increasing Latino population
14	Study Districts in Kobe
15	Shin-Nagata Study District Low to moderate income area Severely damaged by fire Affordable housing, mixed-use, shoe industry
16	Shin-Nagata Study District: Rebuilding Progress 1998
17	Misuga Study District Low to moderate income area with mixed uses Severely damaged by fire
18	Misuga Study District: Rebuilding Progress 1998
19	Shin-Zaike Study District Mixed use area of industrial (former sake district) and residential “Gray zone” area with several unique recovery strategies
20	Ashiya Study District Looked at recovery across the entire city Upper income, primarily residential area Relied heavily upon private recovery funding mechanisms
21	Economic Context for Recovery Both California and Kansai region of Japan: In recession Depressed land prices and commercial vacancies Los Angeles: High vacancy rate in rental housing, reduced need for temporary housing Kobe: Economy moving from heavy industry (steel) toward office and service sectors Unemployment problems increased after earthquake Kobe’s heavily damaged center accelerated population relocation to new suburbs Limited use of earthquake insurance for financing recovery
22	Both Cities: Key Recovery Actions National governments immediately invested large sums for public facilities and infrastructure Loan programs for residences and businesses came later
23	Los Angeles: Key Recovery Actions Initial focus on “ghost towns” to stabilize neighborhoods These were streets where most apartment buildings were vacated 17 ghost towns 17,000 units Buildings were crime magnets
24	Los Angeles: Key Recovery Actions Used federal “block grant” (CDBG) funds to provide no-interest loans to rebuild rental housing Some federal (SBA) loans for homeowners and small businesses Limited commercial loan program for those ineligible for SBA Many of these focused on new and existing redevelopment areas, especially Hollywood
25	Kobe: Key Recovery Actions Comprehensive, top-down approach Initial 2-month moratorium, during which City planned: Major centers, trunk roads, parks, public housing Based on pre-existing plans for large housing and redevelopment projects Land readjustment to resubdivide damaged areas Provide new roads and parks One of few ways, under national law, for City to receive funds for reconstruction Urban redevelopment to resubdivide and reconstruct Other residential financing tools, especially for 17 restoration promotion districts
26	Key Findings of Joint Research Both experiences illustrate the important influences of: previous plans citizen participation pressures of time complexities of land ownership and tenure, and availability of funding Findings are applicable to disasters in industrialized nations, possibly other nations
27	1. Pre-existing plans and institutional structures can facilitate redevelopment Kobe: Had established neighborhood planning mechanisms and redevelopment areas Locations already targeted in pre-existing plans for housing, commercial and office centers, new roads
28	1. Pre-existing plans, continued Los Angeles: Redevelopment and revitalization efforts in Hollywood were ongoing; earthquake helped accelerate them City’s recovery plan established agency roles Pre-existing zoning guided repairs Pre-existing business organizations helped commercial recovery
29	2. Community involvement is vital, especially if widespread reconstruction is needed In Kobe, the City funded planners to work with local “machizukuri” organizations Land readjustment depended on machizukuri Consultants helped to build consensus and negotiate complex agreements Neighborhood planning processes maintained community fabric during reconstruction In LA, community involvement played a less important role since damage was repairable and issues simpler
30	3. After a disaster, time is important Reconstruction needs time to be accomplished thoughtfully New buildings and communities will exist for many years Community involvement takes time, but creates better places and empowers residents Damage and impacts take time to discover and document Redevelopment time is controversial, but previous plans and policies can reduce the time Desire for speedy solutions to pre-existing issues is intensifed Difficult economic and social problems worsen Downward trends accelerate However, in both cities, positive planning efforts had an opportunity to grow Issues had to be managed in condensed time frames Disadvantaged lose out if they have to wait too long for help
31	4. Ownership and tenure issues complicate reconstruction In LA, uninsured condos were problematic: Required cooperation to finance repairs If some owners left, the burden increased on those who remained City had no programs to help In Kobe, government developed financing schemes for condos: But Japanese law requires consensus decisions among all owners in a condo building
32	4. Ownership and tenure, continued Japan has complicated land tenure: Separate ownership/rental of land, structures and housing units Government programs supported several types of joint housing options, enabled by complicated financing schemes Kobe’s land readjustment created more complex tenure issues: Occupancy of relocated lots Relocation of owners and renters Some buildings survived the earthquake, but not the readjustment
33	5. Money is important External funding makes a big difference for regional recovery Block grant funds and private insurance in LA When insurance is unavailable, public funds are needed Kobe and future LA earthquakes Flexibility of funding is important since disaster conditions cannot be exactly predicted In LA, the block grant funds were applied to ghost towns, then to apartment buildings Kobe’s hands were tied by Central Government requirements
34	5. Money, continued There are always hidden costs to pay: Government: bond payments, tax deferrals Individuals: loss of personal wealth, new debts, loss of retirement savings In Kobe, many people have new homes, but smaller spaces, higher costs, and depleted savings Those with limited resources need the most help, and need it immediately: Elderly and immigrants Impacted small businesses in LA disappeared Residents of Kobe neighborhoods left and did not return In LA, some development companies did well financially, but many building owners sold at a loss
35	General Observations and Conclusions In Los Angeles: “Ghost town” loan program successfully rebuilt damaged housing, stabilized and upgraded neighborhoods Program (focused on repairs) matched the damage need and reduced recovery time (only 500 units demolished) Housing loan program required inclusion of 20% affordable units – a redevelopment improvement Flexibility of block grant form of funding, and national trust of local staff, helped speed both the funding and the recovery
36	General Observations and Conclusions, continued In Kobe, urban landscape and social environment of many neighborhoods has been significantly altered Complex ownership patterns, compounded by land readjustment processes, density bonuses and a lack of private resources, fueled the change Many new parks and better streets Housing policies favored full reconstruction, and limited funds for repairs encouraged demolitions While housing quality is improved, high-rise buildings replaced smaller, wooden and post-war structures Some residents are permanently displaced unable to afford replacement housing As many buildings were financed by adding units, Kobe is now overbuilt and with bills to pay
37	General Observations and Conclusions, continued Kobe and Los Angeles experiences illustrate a variety of reconstruction approaches and outcomes Japan, more than the U.S., focused on a comprehensive top-down approach to recovery planning and financing Both national governments gave highest priority to rapid rebuilding of infrastructure Hardest hit districts were targeted for special attention Pre-existing programs did not match damage needs Substantial need for coordinated, public and private financial assistance Post-earthquake processes reflect problems typical of local planning (e.g. multiple interests, conflicting goals, tension between local and societal needs) Programs often developed ad-hoc and lacked a comprehensive view Neighborhood-level planning processes and consultants were critical in maintaining community fabric